Africa and Latin America. Section 3 goes on to look at how "special and differential treatment" ("S&D treatment") for LDCs has been applied within the design of contemporary FTAs; particularly in those Asian FTAs which include a mix of more developed, developing and least developed countries. Section 4 explores how addressing poverty under the multilateral trading system fits into a larger landscape of global developmental policies.
Section 5 in turn discusses how preferential access granted by rich countries to poor countries now risks erosion by the global proliferation of RTAs, while Section 6 addresses some conceptual and practical difficulties encountered in translating S&D treatment into workable principles of RTA design. In the concluding section, we ask whether preferential arrangements for poor countries, which proceed from a distinct set of assumptions about global justice, are now threatened by the growth of RTAs.
[a]1. A SHORT HISTORY OF PREFERENCES FOR POOR COUNTRIES UNDER THE
GATT [b]1.
The Rise and Fall of the MFN Clause
The multilateral trading system embraces non-discrimination between trading partners in the form of the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment (GATT Article I). Generally speaking, any trading concession given by one member nation of the GATT/WTO to another is simultaneously and unconditionally given to all the other GATT-WTO members.
The United States (US) was the architect of the GATT's MFN rule. Although the idea of a simultaneous and unconditional grant to treaty partners of concessions made to a third nation had been a well-established feature of European economic relations by the 19th century, the idea of worldwide MFN treatment owes its origins to the inclusion of such MFN clauses in Cordell Hull's pursuit of bilateral treaties with US trading partners, and subsequently the inclusion of such a clause by the US in the negotiations leading to the creation of the GATT. 6 Such a clause was not enthusiastically accepted by Britain and France which sought to preserve their imperial preferences instead. 7 Subsequently, the creation of the European Economic Communities (the "EEC") in 1957, and particularly the preferences which the EEC wished to accord to African nations (under various Association Agreements) dealt a further blow to the MFN idea. The EEC sought to characterise these special arrangements as free trade agreements within the meaning of GATT Article XXIV; some GATT members baulked at the idea but the GATT membership eventually compromised, for political reasons, and agreed to grant the EEC a waiver from its MFN obligations instead. provided poor countries with preferential concessions from its inception. This idea was not thereafter reintroduced during the GATT's 1954-5 Review Session. 9 Instead, the focus of that Review Session turned towards the ability of poor countries to escape their GATT obligations, albeit temporarily, when confronted with balance of payment (BOP) problems instead. However, the original conditions for invoking these developing country exceptions were too stringent and the Review Session succeeded only in relaxing that stringency (GATT Articles XII and VIII.B). That period also included a relaxation of the requirement that developing countries should be required to reciprocate during negotiations, but this was only 6 Dam (2004) . 7 See e.g. British Imperial Preferences, "grandfathered" or reserved under GATT Art. 1(2)-(4). 8 Hudec (1990) : 211-14. 9 Hudec (1987): 26. vaguely stated; and a slight relaxation of the requirement regarding poor countries' ability to plead the need to develop their infant industries under GATT Article XVIII was accepted.
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In other words, the developing countries were, at the time, focused on obtaining special permission to (a) derogate from their GATT obligations in the face of BOP difficulties, (b) develop their infant industries, and (c) be relieved of the need for full reciprocity during trade negotiations.
The Haberler Report of 1958 soon marked a different turn, namely, a call for developing countries to achieve greater market access instead, particularly for cotton textiles and tropical products. Thus the stance of the poorer countries turned from a defensive posture to an offensive one, characterised by the search for larger markets abroad. As has been mentioned, eventually the GATT Contracting Parties enacted the Enabling Clause, thus placing previous waivers from the stringent application of the MFN rule to developed country concessions to poor nations on a more stable legal footing.
[b]1.3 Developing Country Demands from the GATT to the WTO Era Importantly, the Enabling Clause became the basis for a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries. The US wanted one, global "generalised" system, but on this the EEC and the US could not agree. This led to one European system of preferences, and another US-led worldwide system. Essentially, the system is non-obligatory. With the US GSP system, for example, preferences are granted to listed beneficiary countries in respect of specific listed products. In addition, the US system applies the concept of graduation and also that of competitive need limitations. The former serves to remove poor nations which have made progress from GSP treatment, while the latter caps the concessions made to specific 10 Ibid., 26-32. beneficiaries for specific products during each year. In the scholarly literature and in activist circles, critical attention has long been focused on the qualifications required for inclusion as a GSP beneficiary. One recurrent criticism is directed at the need on the part of developing nations to fulfil stated preconditions even though these do not always appear to be directly trade related.
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In any event, GSP programmes are far from evincing a simple recognition of the moral-political demands of global redistributive justice. A similar criticism is sometimes heard in relation to other aspects of the WTO's regime for S&D treatment. For example, Part IV of the GATT is said to be largely unhelpful to poor countries and ineffective since it requires poor nations to renegotiate their commitments themselves; 12 while the requirements for exercising the BOP exception (discussed earlier) are simply too difficult to fulfil.
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The crux of the issue for developing countries in the context of the Doha Round of negotiations is that the Uruguay Round had delivered too little to developing country WTO members. The Uruguay Round had been based on a grand compromise. Poor countries would have better access to markets for their textiles and tropical products in exchange for granting market access to rich countries in services and for granting better protection to intellectual property. 14 However, the developing country complaint has been that the promises made to the developing country nations have not been fulfilled. The current Doha Round is proving difficult precisely because it promises to rectify this imbalance which -developing counties 11 UN ECOSOC, "The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights," Preliminary Report submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1999/8, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (15 June 2000), para. 17.
12 First, critics have pointed out that Part IV is not "obligatory" but "declaratory" in nature. See Lee (2008): 3-__, 8-10, 14-16 . Secondly, "non-reciprocity" has become a negotiation issue in practice. See Hoda (2001) : 56 et seq. In short, developed countries are not legally obligated, indeed they cannot in practice be simply subjected to a legal obligation, to negotiate successfully with developing countries on the basis of lessthan-full reciprocity.
13 For more background on how developing country participation in the GATT-WTO evolved, see Hoekman and Kostecki (2001): 385-91; Kessie (2007): 12-__. 14 See also Bhala (2008): 34-5, 60-62 (on the Uruguay Round "Grand Bargain" and its subsequent "breakdown").
claim -exists within the world trading system. Sceptics say the Round, which at the time of writing is widely acknowledged to be in grave jeopardy, was doomed to failure from the outset.
Against the background of the controversies just described, the GSP system itself has become the object of litigation. 17 McCulloch (1974) . Another earlier case worth mentioning in this context is Uruguay's famous "test case" which was brought during the GATT era; for which, see further Hudec (1987) : 46-7.
[a]2. COMPARING PREFERENTIAL MARKET ACCESS UNDER GSP AND FTA
PROGRAMMES
What both developing country preferences and RTAs have in common is that they each form a different kind of exception to the MFN rule. However, there the similarity ends. First, the motivations for entering into an RTA and for granting developing country preferences differ.
Admittedly political, strategic and other considerations may apply in the case of both, but RTAs -unlike the argument for developing country preferences -are ostensibly and legally about achieving trade liberalisation which cannot otherwise be achieved, or is not sought, multilaterally.
GATT Article XXIV imposes stringent conditions (at least on paper) on the formation of RTAs. It requires the liberalisation of substantially all the trade between the RTA partners (the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V has a similar requirement in the context of services trade). Thus, one of the most important preconditions for the creation of a lawful RTA is that, unlike a rich nation granting some degree of preferential access to a poor nation, the parties to an RTA must all, co-equally, liberalise substantially all the trade between them.
18 While in some cases in an RTA between more than two parties what one party grants to another may be different from what it grants to the third or other members on a reciprocal basis, 19 the amount of liberalisation required of all the parties is -broadly speaking -equally demanding in order to achieve a requisite "balance" in the negotiations. Thirdly, and most importantly, RTAs are typically justified on purely economic grounds (trade liberalisation) while GSP programmes are, at least publicly, justified on the basis that some principle of global redistributive justice demands it. In the case of GSP programmes, the animating principle involved is to provide market access for developing country exports as a means of promoting their growth and development.
There is every sign today that both the US and EU have shifted the trade relations governed under their GSP programmes towards regulation under a range of newly emerging FTAs and EPAs. The reasons for this shift differ in their exact detail. In the case of US FTAs with Latin American former GSP beneficiaries, a search for so-called "NAFTA parity" is evident, particularly against a background of fear of increased competition from Mexico. It is also a rational, long-term policy choice for the developing countries in question since beneficiary status under the US GSP system is more precarious than the enjoyment of a treaty right of access to rich country markets under an FTA. As for the EU's EPAs with ACP countries, this was prompted by external pressure in the form of an adverse WTO ruling in the Bananas III case. Consequently, the EU's developing country partners now have a choice between having a "modified" GSP preference scheme or entering into an EPA with the EU. [a]3. CAN FTAS ACCOMMODATE SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT?
In short, FTAs can attempt to address poverty issues and they should. Clearly, such a viewpoint is not uncontroversial however. It faces the same objections as those which have been raised for more than a half century against the deleterious effects that trade liberalisation can have on poorer countries. Historically, the criticism goes back to Australia's GATT position in leading what was then considered to be the "developing 23 For the ASEAN treaties, including ASEAN-China, see a negotiator's account in Chin (2010) . For the EU's current approach, see Bormann et al. (2006) [quotation]He seems unaware that his Big Plan is strikingly similar to the ideas that inspired foreign aid in the 1950s and 60s. Just like Sachs, development planners then identified countries caught in the "poverty trap," did an assessment of how much they would need to make a "big push" into growth, and called upon foreign aid to fill the "financing gap" between the countries' own resources and needs. This legacy has influenced the bureaucratic approach to economic development that has been followed since -albeit with some lip service to free markets -by the World Bank, regional development banks, national aid agencies and the UN development agencies. Spending $2.3 trillion (measured in today's dollars) in aid over the past five decades has left most aid-intensive regions wallowing in continued stagnation; it is fair to say this approach has not been a great success. While these distinct approaches have emerged separately over time, they can also be combined together. Recognition that "one Big Plan does not fit all" counsels their combination. On this view, aid and trade have therefore become "aid for trade".
There are yet other approaches, such as the need for technology (and thus technology transfer arrangements) to be put in place. FTA chapters on intellectual property protection impinge on such concerns. To become developed, poor countries need better access to technology, but to assure foreign direct investors who are concerned that their trade secrets and intellectual property will be protected by law, developing countries have had to abandon the technology transfer laws of a previous era and enact industrial property protection laws in their place instead.
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Another approach is to foster education, the institutions of contract and property law, the rule of law more broadly (and human rights protection). and the broad role that education plays (i.e. human capacity-building) in developmental theory. As for contract and property laws, and the rule of law generally, FTA provisions on investor and investment protection accomplish much of that. FTAs can also include the establishment of legal regimes that are aimed at correcting market failures. One prime example is the common inclusion in US FTAs of competition chapters, some of which have required the enactment of generic anti-trust laws by FTA partners for the first time. Yet FTAs and EPAs are very different from the original idea of developing country preferences. What they seek to achieve stands in marked contrast to the earlier post-war import substitution policies of many developing countries, and both preferential trading arrangements and today's FTAs underscore a "growth through trade" policy. A crucial difference is that FTAs expect growth to be a near-automatic result of trade liberalisation.
The way such RTAs are to be achieved is through the modality of reciprocal trade negotiations. In contrast, developing country preferential schemes seek out preferential trade terms on a non-reciprocal (or less than fully reciprocal) basis. It is this doctrine of "nonreciprocity" that makes up the redistributionist credentials of developing country preferential schemes, while the strict reciprocal nature of FTAs seems to push FTAs in an opposing direction and in this way risks eroding the non-reciprocal gains achieved through developing country preferential schemes.
The problem, however, is not unique to RTAs. Trade liberalisation of any sort -be it multilateral, regional or bilateral -would tend to erode preferential market access for developing countries. This is one important issue for those developing countries which do not wish to see preference erosion in the context of the current Doha Round negotiations.
However, it is precisely because of the GATT's, and subsequently the WTO's record -in contrast with, for example, the international financial institutions -in fostering developing country participation in redistributionist rule-making that makes the Doha negotiations so hard fought at the present time. RTAs are seen as eroding not just developing country preferences which are granted unilaterally by developed nations, but also the multilateral system itself, which for long has presented itself as the principal forum for the renegotiating of the basic terms of global trade between the developed and the developing nations.
38 38 On the importance of the multilateral trading system to poor countries, see Lim (2008a) . Recall that the principles that embody S&D treatment in the GATT-WTO process fall into three categories: (a) special permission or flexibility in trade rules to protect developing country markets ("permissive protection"), (b) non-reciprocity and (c) preferential market access. 39 Recall how the developing countries had fought for and gained preferential market access, and recognition of non-reciprocity as important principles in the multilateral trading system.
Permissive protection for poorer countries is in fact as old as the GATT's "BOP exception". It is nothing new. During the Uruguay Round, permissive protection shifted from the more basic idea of straightforward exemptions from the GATT rule obligations of developing members to recognition that, notwithstanding the desire to integrate the poorer countries, there should be longer transition periods before the obligations incurred by WTO members should fully apply to developing country members. This was combined with the idea of technical assistance and these "new" ideas -longer phase-ins and technical assistance 39 Trachtman (2003): 11-13.
-were then interspersed across a whole spectrum of subject-specific WTO agreements emerging out of the Uruguay Round.
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Today, permissive protection has come back to the fore. In the Doha negotiations the most prominent example of a major negotiating difference is the divide over a special safeguard mechanism (SSM) which developing countries claim is needed to deal with import surges. The problem is that the exact "price trigger" for that safeguard mechanism to come into operation has proven elusive, 41 as is the list of developing country "special products"
which will be exempted from tariff cuts on grounds of food security and rural development. American and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (APC) Group's concerns about preference erosion in tropical products. 55 What is noteworthy about the 2008 collapse was the fact that few had anticipated that SSM -in other words, permissive protection for the poorer nations -would become a principal issue. China, now included in the G7 group of leading countries was blamed, together with India.
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With multilateral talks continuing to linger over such distributive justice and other concerns, how then do RTAs intersect or interact with, or affect, these concerns? One widely supposed connection already mentioned is that the proliferation of today's new FTAs is inversely related to progress in multilateral trade talks. Countries like the US and Singapore have pursued "competitive liberalisation" in order to spur or provide a fall-back plan to global trade talks -the two being not the same thing. 57 Others seek FTAs as an alternative because of other kinds of dissatisfaction. China, for example, is seeking to undo nonrecognition of its market economy status through its bilateral FTAs. Hostility to the growth of RTAs therefore is at least partly related to the diminution in the importance of, or distraction from, the Doha Development Agenda and, more broadly, the WTO. Similarly, current attempts to form, in the longer term, a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific creates an alternative, "Plan B" to the Doha Round. 58 Others argue that RTA partner selection could by-pass the poorest countries for these may have little to offer. Yet others point out that the problem is compounded when a "domino effect" might mean that more countries will enter, or have entered, into RTAs simply because they have no choice.
For these reasons, there is concern that RTAs threaten developing countries' efforts to achieve distributive justice goals in the WTO, by throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It may be closer to the truth that the baby of distributive justice is precisely what countries that wish to accelerate tariff liberalisation wish to throw out. Where the Doha Round has been stalled by the insistence of the large, rising developing nations (China, India, Brazil and South Africa) arguing that developing countries should be accommodated further, this marks a curious paradox. The more staunchly these developing countries maintain their position, the greater the incentive the developed nations have to pursue an alternative "track" of RTA liberalisation instead.
Efforts to "multilateralise" RTAs in order to curb their economic and discriminatory ill-effects do not address the distributive justice issue. 59 The aim should not be to make RTAs more multilateral, in terms simply of extending their membership, but to be more "like" the multilateral system in reflecting the concerns of the poorer nations.
[a]6. A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM But if RTAs were to seek to incorporate S&D treatment even more fully in their design, various conceptual difficulties which have arisen in Geneva will not simply disappear. These conceptual difficulties will make it more difficult instead to imagine the ways in which S&D treatment might feature in RTA design.
59 See the excellent collection in Baldwin and Low ( 2009 At the multilateral level, debate has centred on the potential use of multiple criteria (e.g. income, degree of vulnerability, land-locked nations, etc.) as opposed to a single criterion for differentiation due to the bluntness of a single criterion approach -for example, a per capita income approach. The benefit of such an approach is that there will, hopefully, be an even spread of wins and losses across developing countries. Another bold possibility is to define S&D treatment by circumstances and events -e.g. by, or partly by, the occurrence of natural disasters such as droughts, floods, etc. -thereby by-passing the need for identification of countries a priori based on contested criteria.
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Thus, to compound the difficulty of translating S&D treatment as a multilateral concept into a workable doctrine at the level of regional trade agreements, there has been no agreement multilaterally on the framing principles and objectives of S&D treatment.
During the Uruguay Round, diverse S&D provisions came into being but there was an absence of guidance on broader framing principles and objectives. 66 The operation of the former provision is well-described by Lee (2008) , while the latter is described in Alex Easson, Tax Incentives For Foreign Direct Investment (Hague: Kluwer, 2004 72 Developing country preferences may be justified on the basis that they intend to produce an equality of outcomes (substantive equality); thus the differential treatment embodied in them is not "discriminatory" and is justified by the global distributive aims sought to be achieved.
As such, FTAs adopt a different conception of the world when compared with developing country preferences. Unlike the GATT-WTO, FTAs allow discrimination and selective concessions; but that is not the only difference. FTAs are also premised upon a view of equality that is based purely on formal sovereign equality as opposed to a substantive conception of equality which prizes equality of outcomes. As such, today's FTAs risk ignoring attempts since the days of the GATT to persuade developed countries to recognise the demands of cosmopolitan justice (e.g. through GSP programmes, the principle of nonreciprocity, etc.). One solution is to have S&D treatment built into common FTA design but we have seen that some of the conceptual challenges encountered in the WTO may yet be Yet there are already signs that RTAs will need to take developing country views into account, in the same way that the multilateral system has had to do. The question is whether these RTAs do enough, or threaten the poverty agenda instead. For many, the hope is that the conclusion of the Doha Round, wherein the needs of developing countries might be taken into proper account, is the only way of resisting the diminution of developing country claims to greater global distributive justice through the proliferation of RTAs. Despite the considerable difficulties surveyed in this chapter, we should not believe that is the only possible view. 
